

Subject and Method: Foucault, Derrida and the Historian's craft.

"The stakes of the debate are clearly indicated: could there be anything exterior to philosophical discourse?"

Michel Foucault in "My Body, This Paper, This Fire".

PART I

The primary question I wish to examine is the relationship between method and the Subject. The Social Sciences take Man as the object of study, and work with and through him in diverse ways. Man as the object is related to the subjectivity of Man, and it is often the problem of this subjectivity and the limits imposed on him, his movement and the restrictions placed on the twin axes of time and space that form the arena of social-scientific research. When it comes to Man, his being the object is simultaneous with him being the Subject – as a free rational being. It is this simultaneity, its implications and preconditions that will be one aspect of the fundamental problematic explored in the paper. Historians are particularly concerned with Man through the question of time, the ways in which he has changed and the reasons behind this change. However the object of study and the Subject carrying out the study do not have a neutral relation. Social Scientists need to construct a method to deal with their object. Yet as they themselves are men they are thereby implicated in the object of their study – Man. Therefore method cannot be purely instrumental, it being inflected by the subjectivity of the double subject (social scientist/man as subject and the subject of Man as object). If method is irreducibly linked to this double subject what can its value and status be? This will be the other aspect of the problematic. I attempt to deal with these difficult questions through dividing the body of the paper in two parts. In the first I focus on the specifics of a debate that ensued between Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. Derrida, who launches a critique of Foucault's *Madness and Civilization*, initiates the debate. Nine years later Foucault replies.. After first dealing with the specifics of the debate, in the second part I go on to do a close reading of *Madness and Civilization* hoping to reveal the limitations of the debate, for dealing with the difficult questions outlined earlier; taking us more directly to the relationship between the practice of history writing and the questions of subject and method. In this section I include into discussion the work of more 'conventional historians' to see how one can rethink the craft of history writing in the light of both the debate and the actual work of Foucault.

Madness and Civilization is explicitly concerned with rescuing the phenomena of madness from the histories that psychology and psychiatry have given us. Thus we already have an initial difficulty, a departure from conventional social science. Foucault is not concerned with the Subject, but with the ways in which what is now seen as madness might have been constituted in a particular manner and might have existed differently before its 'constitution'. Madness is the ostensive subject/object, already a fracturing of the Subject-object (Man) because of its inherent instability and lack of coherence. Descartes often serves as marking

the inauguration of modern subjectivity and he is given a small place in this vast history of madness. Modern subjectivity as the conventional subject/object of social science thus occupies a minor region in Foucault's cartography of 'silence'. It is this region that serves as the ground on which Derrida launches his critique. I first intend to do a critical reading of Derrida's critique that will need to mimic its object by being close and patient, before returning to Foucault's text.

PART II

Derrida opens his "reflections" (31 WD) by claiming Michel Foucault's book to be the point of *departure*. This is followed by a paragraph, poetic and allusive that articulates the simultaneous difficulty and necessity of crafting the point of origin, of enunciating a position, carving out a *beginning*; in effect starting to speak. A rich matrix has already been cast in the space of these two paragraphs that will sustain the Derridian effort. The point of departure is the pre-text, in this case *Madness and Civilization* for a reflection, a point from which one leaves; only to return, for what is a reflection. Is this different from a point of origin, dealt with next? The relation cannot be one of implication, result – point of departure leading to point of origin? A paradox. In this next passage, or perhaps better put in the paragraph (the writing alongside) the simultaneous contestant, the primary difficulty is the 'how' of the point of origin, how does one begin. Leaving and setting out have crossed each other here.

Derrida alludes to the fact of having been Michel Foucault's 'disciple' he is hesitant to begin; and yet it is not the person Foucault who intimidates as past-master, but rather "the master within him and before him", a master who performs his function, gives his commands only through the face of the disciple (also within). This unhappy consciousness - this dialectic of the mutual dependency of master and disciple is what makes the articulation, a position, an act that is not subservient to the interminable tie between master and pupil, an act that can be so by definition only in its utter singularity, leaping out of this paralytic play, characterizes the division that is now the paralysis called Derrida. And yet to act, would be to speak in the realization that the comfort of the dialectical shade exists no longer, the master's hand no longer leads or reprimands one is in deed alone and therefore speaks. Therefore the reflection uses the book as a point of departure, for one can no longer engage, perhaps this is what Derrida's claim is, after having stepped aside, jumped beyond the fact about which one is going to reflect upon. Here we have another kind of reflection (not the dialectical reflection of the mirror of the second paragraph that muted speech) but rather a reflection that has an asymmetrical relationship to the object of sight, where the space in-between is warped with a density that barricades itself from the consumptive intimacy of a mirroring dialectic.

From two paragraphs, we turn to the next. Here Derrida says that the route of his considerations would be neither straight nor unlinear, but rather he would go "straight to the most general questions that will serve as the focal points of these reflections"(32 WD). General questions will be the focal points of the reflections; this might seem paradoxical or perhaps contradictory for how can questions serve as focal points. Focal points perform the function of shaping a discourse (in this case a reflection), how do questions that are indeterminate (those that seek or beckon the determinate) themselves serve as focal points when they themselves are those through which a focal point is generally displaced. One can of course understand a question as being the pretext, the occasion, the blank space that

invites an answer, a work, a reflection. But as an exteriority, as that which beckons from a distance, the reason, but the reason behind suitably placed before, thought of beforehand. And yet an indeterminacy. Can the question that is open, gaping, center the volume of a thought ? – a question perhaps best approached later. This paragraph can be seen as the way to reach out to the next two paragraphs, serving as the line between the preface and work by/ through its own admittance (in terms of consciousness and real/written/spatial entry).

We have a repetition here: between the enunciation of work and the preface. Derrida repeats his point of departure; however with a slight difference. In the opening paragraph the claim was that it was the book of Michel Foucault that performed the point of departure; here Derrida takes 3 pages in a 673 page book as his point of departure. It must be noted that Derrida never actually says this, but this can be inferred because in the repetition of the point of departure he anticipates the allegation that this might be “slight and artificial”(32 WD) and then goes right into the three pages mentioned where Foucault makes the claim that in Descartes madness was “denied the right to philosophical consideration” (32 WD)(Derrida uses a number of adjectives in characterizing Foucault’s claim, shifts in phrases that cannot be considered, but only registered here, but which will return in numerous disguises in our following considerations). The following paragraph then serves to substantiate by returning to the claim made in the opening of the lecture. It is after all a simple repetition, a repetition without difference, for the difference between the book (the first point of departure) and the second (the reading of Descartes), is not a real one. For Derrida says, “ Foucault’s entire project can be pinpointed in these few allusive and somewhat enigmatic pages, and that the reading of Descartes and the Cogito proposed to us engages in its problematic the totality of this History of Madness as regards both its intention and its feasibility”(32 WD). The act of exclusion that the modern Subject forms in its very constitution is at the core of Foucault’s enterprise. This – the Subject and his exclusion of madness - is held to be the object of study. The entire book is indeed in those few lines, or so Derrida says. It is in the context of this claim that we can deal with the series of questions that Derrida then poses.

Having established the subject as he sees it Derrida goes on to critique Foucault in a way that simultaneously serves as the site for an elaboration of his own method. Method and subject participate in one another. First series of questions posed: Derrida asks whether Foucault has successfully deciphered, interpreted Descartes lines, has the full meaning been uncovered. This is divided into 2 questions, first, “Have we *fully* understood the sign itself, *in itself*? Has what Descartes said and meant been clearly perceived and understood”(32 WD). Second, Derrida asks whether Foucault has successfully determined the relationship between this text and the historical structure (it must be noted that this is a Derridian binary), and whether the meaning of the text is “exhausted by its historicity”(33 WD). Through the phraseology one can detect the subseriant status of the ‘historical structure’ in relation to the sign, as he says it is only ‘once’ on has determined the meaning of the sign in itself one moves on to the question of historical structure. Let us note in passing the implications as well as the presuppositions of the above questions. Meaning exits, in and as itself - for Foucault is questioned at the level on his hermeneutic skills; and there is a relation - nor fully determined by Foucault according to Derrida, between this and historical structure. Derrida does not elaborate on this historical structure, [not his subject] either on his own terms or on the terms through which Foucault has set up his project. Strange, and intriguing if one remembers this was Foucault’s *work*, his project, in fact the book that formed the first point of departure; only to be replaced by certain lines of Descartes a little later, a replacement whose meaning is erased by a theory of meaning itself. For Derrida’s very claim is that the meaning of the book can be found to reside, make home, reveal itself in its fullness in these lines where

Foucault reads Descartes. An inadequate reading transparently revealing the inadequacy of Archeological method. And in this overlapping of book and lines; Derrida now wonders, through the terms he has set-up, whether Foucault has fully understood Descartes, whether the relationship between these lines of Descartes and the historical structure has been validly determined, and then whether the former can be exhausted by the latter's historicity. The violence of exclusion that constitutes the Subject's subjectivity is held to the true and real object of study. Is this really the case in *Madness and Civilization*? No effort to examine the nature of the 'historical structure' that Foucault is himself trying to elaborate, and no effort to examine with care and patience with which Foucault weaves the contorted relationships between the various articulations of Concept and Event.

Second series of questions posed by Derrida. Derrida, claims that the Cogito is perhaps not as accusative and "objectifying of it (madness) than Foucault seems to think" (33 WD), for the Cogito is an "experience which, at its farthest reaches, is perhaps no less adventurous, perilous, nocturnal and pathetic than the history of madness" (33 WD). The Cogito as Subject has a mysterious kinship with madness, Derrida in effect takes the liberty of making a claim about the 'experience of madness'. In the space of a few lines Derrida then states the impossibility of writing the history of madness itself – or to use Foucault's words "the archaeology of a silence", and sees the Foucauldian project as only being a "efficacious and subtle restoration of the ..of the act perpetrated against madness"(35). In effect he is saying that Madness cannot be the subject or object of a study. A curious crack in the structure of Derrida's argument. Let us try to examine why. Just a little while ago Derrida announced the possible complicity of the Cogito in the experience of madness - something he accused Foucault of being insensitive to; and now he accuses Foucault of repeating the Cartesian exclusion of madness - only possible if one is blind to the prior complicity postulated. Derrida cannot have it both ways, especially when he even seems unaware of the gaping abyss that lies beneath this fork. Derrida goes on to substantiate the impossibility of writing about madness for "the revolution against reason can only be made within it, in accordance with a Hegelian law to which I myself was very sensitive "(36 WD). A sensitivity to the 'law' as a matter of fact, as well as a sensitivity to it in Foucault's text – though he admits no direct reference to Foucault in *Madness and Civilization*. One wonders who is ostracizing madness into the mute ground and the pale night of Unreason. Here it is only Reason - Man as Subject however *inadequate*- that can be the authentic object of an investigation. But one has to wait a little to madness to appear in the Derridean text.

Derrida is not unaware of Foucault's sensitivity to the difficulty that impregnates a project wishing to speak of madness. And here it is the 'as' that has to substitute the 'of' , saturating its instrumentalist distance. And Derrida even says, in perhaps the most perceptive line in his lecture, "One could perhaps say that the resolution of the difficulty is *practiced* rather than *formulated*"(37 WD) . A key acknowledgement. Derrida yet again criticizes the lack of explicitly methodological self-reflexivity, but a few sentences later recognizes that "once the question and the privileged difficulty are understood, to devote a preliminary work to them would have entailed the sterilization or paralysis of further enquiry"(38 WD). Another key acknowledgement that will require us to return. Thus methodological self reflexivity is not only prior to the actual object(s) of study, but requires an effort that will make any other effort (an effort that can only be a consequence of the primary effort) impossible. Thus method has become the fundamental subject.

Here at this point, almost suddenly Derrida seems to agree almost fully with the essence of Foucault's project (*as he sees it*) in its effort to " the issue is therefore to reach the point at

which dialogue was broken off, dividing itself into two soliloquies- what Foucault calls using a very strong word, the Decision. The Decision, through a single act, links and separates reason and madness, and it must at once be understood at once both as the original act of an order, a fiat, a schism, a caesura, a separation, a dissection” (38 WD). This serves, however as the prologue to Derrida’s elaboration of his own project in relation to the question of madness. He says “In order to account simultaneously for the origin (or the possibility) of the decision for the origin (or the possibility) of its narration, it might have been necessary to start by reflecting this original logos in which the violence of the classical era played itself out. The history of logos before the Middle Ages and before the classical age is not, if this need be said at all, a nocturnal and mute prehistory, Whatever the momentary break, if there is one, of the Middle Ages with the Greek tradition, this break and this alteration are late and secondary developments as concerns the fundamental permanence of the logico-philosophical heritage”(39 WD). The register on which Derrida is operating on is conceptual. It is at this level, here and perhaps elsewhere, of a history of the concept that Derrida is leveling his critique. Again it is thus the concept as method/subject that is the primary object of analysis. Whereas archeology, a *practice*, elaborated in its full dimensions only later by Foucault, as it operates in *Madness and Civilization* and elsewhere is critical of the very methodology of a purely conceptual approach, contesting the latter’s very possibility. The very distinction between method (at the level of the concept) and practice (historical structure, data collection,) crucial for Derrida is deemed misplaced. For Derrida to be unreflexive about the critical stance Foucault takes/ has already taken in relation to the modality of his critique (ideational with an unelaborated relationship with the event) is perhaps inexcusable. A throbbing problematic that will be investigated at greater length later when examining the text and texture of *Madness and Civilization*. For the moment let us follow Derrida’s way.

The next theme on which Derrida takes issue with Foucault is the relationship between the Classical Cogito and the Greek Logos. We will not let this section detain us, except to register that yet again Derrida’s objections are shaped on a conceptual register. He then goes on to register his *perplexity* with regard to Foucault’s views on the status of philosophical discourse (in this specific case Descartes) to the “historical and socio-political drama”(44 WD). He renews his perplexity at Foucault’s notion of the “historical ensemble”, that includes “notions, institutions, juridical measures, scientific concepts” (44 WD). He then goes on to outline his position that explicitly privileges philosophical discourse. It is best to hear him out here in full: “I do not know to what extent Foucault would agree that the prerequisite for a response to such questions is first of all the internal and autonomous analysis of the philosophical content of philosophical discourse. Only when the totality of this content will have become manifest in its meaning for me (but this is impossible) will I rigorously situate it in its total historical form. It is only then that its reinsertion will not do it violence, that is there will be legitimate reinsertion of *this* philosophical meaning *itself*. As to Descartes in particular, no historical question about him- about the latent historical meaning of his discourse, about its place in a total historical structure- can be answered before a rigorous and exhaustive internal analysis of his manifest intentions, of the manifest meaning of his philosophical discourse has been made”(45 WD). A repetition of the predicative privileging of method as subject over practice on the ground of the assumed distinction. Philosophical meaning is not only a special subject but is the only subject and object of an investigation. It is this that forms the occasion for Derrida to perform his close reading of Descartes *Meditations*.

The lines up until now have been an elaborate set-up. It repeats the fundamental problematic

of Derrida's critique. Philosophical meaning exists in-itself, this has to be determined, this is not possible, and critical thinking is engaged in the Sisyphean task. This is not a caricature of Derrida; this is what he has explicitly stated. In this critique, the fact of the importance of meaning itself has constantly been underlined as a prerequisite to the understanding of historical structure (we must reiterate that this is a Derridian binary). And yet in his other works, especially in his work on Husserl and *Of Grammatology* the onus of his argument is the very impossibility of meaning existing in-itself (in the former this takes the form of the critiquing Husserl's privileging of indication over expression in the *Investigations* and in the latter in the indeterminacy of the sign – as opposed to Saussurian linguistics, through its perpetual difference). But this is still the pretext. Let us see how the move at foregrounding meaning/thought content, that has been the Derridian effort until now, leads to Deconstruction *proper*.

Foucault underlines the exclusion of madness in the constitution of the Cartesian Cogito. Derrida however views the case of the exclusion of madness only as “particular case and, moreover, not the most serious one”(50 WD). After disqualifying madness, Descartes goes on to take the example of dreams, and casts doubt on all sensory perception. Thus for Derrida the case in dreaming, that questions the totality of sensory perception, constitutes “ in the methodological order which is here ours, the hyperbolic exasperation of the hypothesis of madness..the latter affected only certain areas of sensory perception, and in a contingent and partial way”(51). Content with his (perceived) demonstration of the greater importance of the dreaming test over the madness test, Derrida continues by anticipating how Foucault would respond to this critique. The Derridian Foucault could continue by saying that though madness might indeed be the inferior test, this does not prove that it is interned and excluded from rational subjectivity. To this Derrida jumps back to his place, and deals his final cards.

The Derridian Foucault would be right only at the “naïve, natural and premetaphysical stage of Descartes itinerary”, but vulnerable when approaching the “properly philosophical, metaphysical and critical phase of doubt” (52 WD). It is the ‘experiment’ with the evil genius that is said to bring out the possibility of total madness, “no longer the disorder of the body, of the object, the body-object outside the boundaries of *res cogitas*, outside the boundaries of the policed city” (53 WD). It is in this moment, this ‘mad audacity that would consist in the return to an original point which no longer belongs to either a determined reason or determined unreason, not longer belongs to them as opposition or alternative..madness is therefore in every sense a case in thought (within thought) ..it is therefore a question of drawing back to a point at which all determined contradictions, in the form of a given, factual historical structures, can appear and appear as relative to this zero point at which determined meaning and non meaning come together in their common origin” (56 WD). In a further enunciation of his own project, his own method, “In question is a way of accounting for the very historicity of philosophy. I believe that historicity in general would be impossible without a history of philosophy, and I believe that the latter would be impossible if we only possessed hyperbole, on the one hand or on the other only determined historical structures finite *Weltanschauungen*. The historicity proper to philosophy is located and constituted in the tradition, in the dialogue between hyperbole and finite structure, between that which exceeds the totality and the closed totality, the difference between history and historicity; that is in the place where, or rather the moment when, the Cogito and all that it symbolizes here (madness, derangement, hyperbole, etc) pronounce and reassure themselves then to fall, necessarily forgetting themselves until their reactivation, their reawakening in another statement of excess which also later will become another decline and another crisis”

(60 WD).

It is clear that Derrida is proposing an alternative to Archeology. He is not content to critique Foucault, but keen to demonstrate that is necessary to radicalize Foucault's project into one that later generations would can deconstruction. In a certain way, like Descartes moving from the first stage of premetaphysical doubt to a radical properly metaphysical doubt, Derrida seems to be suggesting that Foucauldian archeology too must be lifted from its structural determination to a more fundamental philosophical anthropology. Thus the authentic subject has to be the Subject in its lack of authenticity that necessarily plays itself out as part of its theoretical enunciation. This is the general condition for and as the subject. Man as subject, Man as subject/object are ontologically trapped immune to any genre of specificity – historical or otherwise. Method and subject are but meager instances in this radical aporia.

Foucault responds nine years later, sends Derrida a copy with an apology for having taken so long to respond. This instituted a break in their friendship that was renewed only many years later when Foucault helped Derrida in a court case – the latter arrested on the spuriously charges of possessing marijuana.

Michel Foucault's response is characterized with clarity and contempt. It is directed solely at Derrida's reading of Descartes, and thus a further substantiation of his own original reading. I am tempted to think that this might have been in part because Derrida reputation and strength was in close textual exegesis; and so Foucault perhaps wanted to meet him on his strength. However, the loss with such a pointed response is that there is not a substantial elaboration on the problems that Deconstruction poses for historiography in general. One could prise this out of some of Foucault's more polemical lines in his response; but better still I would argue a close examination of *Madness and Civilization* and some of his other earlier work are an endeavor to get out of precisely the nature of the Deconstructive enterprise. But first it may do well to listen to Foucault's specific response.

Foucault directs his response to Derrida's contestation of his reading of Descartes. He writes to prove the distinctive place of madness in relation to dreams. Firstly dreams, Foucault admits have two advantages in them the acts of madness can be replicated and exceeded ("demonstrative") and in the second place they are frequent and happen often ("accessibility") (396 EMF). Dreaming thus can be incorporated into the meditative exercise – one can reflect about dreaming, it being part of ones experience. Foucault then goes on to do a more detailed reading of the passage on the dreaming example (a vocabulary of memory, thus internal to the subject; familiar examples – being seated, feeling the heat of the fire, the inability to distinguish between dreaming and madness through experience, the conclusion that success of the test leaves the meditating subject to carry on the meditation) and the passage on madness (a vocabulary of comparison, madness as external; examples of entirely other, imagining one's body made of glass; inability to 'test' madness but it is excluded; concludes with a reinscription of the exteriority of madness) to further reiterate the essential difference in the status between the two examples. He then points to the fact that in the example of the madmen the word *insanus* is used, a characterizing term implying sickness, but when Descartes in the course of the meditative act in invited to imitate the *insanus* he immediately dismisses this possibility, for if he did so he would be *demens* (a juridical that disqualifies the subject); and thus the test of madness is impossible and excluded. However in the dreaming case, though he is *dormiens*, he continues to be the meditating subject, there is so disqualification.

Foucault draws attention to the Meditations as being both a set of propositions ("system") as

well as a series of modifications (“exercise”) (406 EMF). It is in the context of this doubleness that madness as an example is impossible, as Descartes cannot be mad, madness being truly external, an imitation of the mad is dismissed outright not only for its impossibility but that because it would disqualify the subject himself as a subject. Yet the example of dreaming forms “part of the virtualities of the subject (I am a man), of his frequently actualized virtualities (I often sleep and dream), of his memories (I clearly remember having dreamed), and of his memories, which can return as vivid impressions (to the point where I can compare my present impression validly with the memory of my dream)” (409 EMF). Thus the example is truly successful because it successfully doubts the actuality of the subject and yet allows the meditation to continue validly. It is in this vein, as a controlled experiment that Foucault also views the test of the evil genius. He continues to differentiate the example of madness and the evil genius at the level of the words used; the former thinking of illusions the latter deciding to think of illusions –“I shall think that the sky ...are nothing but illusions and daydreams” (415 EMF). Foucault also makes it a point to note that the exercise of the meditating subject could be carried up to the evil genius only because and after the example of madness had been (necessarily) excluded.

Foucault’s arguments are convincing, but one should perhaps spend more time on the challenge that Deconstruction poses. For what Deconstruction in effect accuses Archaeology of is the lack of methodological self-reflexivity. Let us go back to Derrida. There is first the explicit privileging of philosophical discourse over historical structures (again a binary of Derrida’s making), and the imperative to fully understand the former, before confronting the challenges of the latter. Here there is a bit of a knot that Derrida ties himself up in, for it is precisely the impossibility of uncovering meaning itself, meaning in-itself that forms the critical thrust of deconstruction. His critique of Husserl is precisely grounded on the impossibility of meaning to reside in-itself as sign and the Derridian sign is one that is intrinsically decomposing on the axis of space and time. However it is not the claim of Deconstruction that there are no structures, or that there is no subject; but rather that the possibility of the latter are predicated precisely on a fundamental instability, on what Derrida in another context calls play. It is precisely so that we can understand some of Derrida’s concluding remarks such as “the historicity proper to philosophy is located and constituted in the transition, the dialogue between hyperbole and the finite structure, between that which exceeds the closed totality and the closed totality” or “the economy of this writing is a regulated relationship between that which exceeds and the exceeded totality; the difference of the absolute excess” (62 WD).

What does this mean? The relationship between this excess and the finite is not articulated or analyzed anywhere. In addition the finite encases within itself the empirical world, the sum of facts and things. Deconstruction is the attempt to consider how is this possible, and in this search frames the empirical through a notion of difference, that is seen as the condition of the possibility of the empirical as such. This is classical philosophy in its search for origins, grounds, causes reasons that remain in-different from/to what it explains. As a result the richness and wealth of the word is equated with a nominal empirical. It is only such that in an examination of a work, rife with detail and analysis, Derrida can even consider extricating a few passages on philosophical discourse and claim he is engaging with the heart of the matter, the core of Foucault’s project. There is no need to consider other aspects that are clearly subservient. The madness of reason is a general ontological phenomena. Thus for Deconstruction the Subject is still the primary object of analysis, though it is instituted only through its own instability. Yet can this be said to be Foucault’s project?

But first, how does Foucault respond? First he points out the empirical nature of the *Meditations* - the meditative exercise - as crucial. Concepts are carried out here, quite literally, where there is no privileging of one over the other. In fact the distinction between the propositional and the exercise is only a heuristic one, for one is constitutive of the other. Yet is that all there is to the argument? Foucault recognized early in his response the importance of this confrontation “The stakes of the debate are clearly indicated: could there be anything exterior to philosophical discourse? Can its condition reside in an exclusion, a refusal, a risk avoided and why not, a fear?”

So the debate seems to revolve around the category of exclusion, and therefore Subject-constitution. Derrida argues that madness is never excluded, and the restricted economy of reason can function only in the general economy of madness. Foucault argues that madness is excluded, and needs to be for philosophical reason to establish its subjectivity. Yet both positions seem inadequate in their understanding of madness through the category of exclusion once we return to *Madness and Civilization* to revisit the category. Excavate exclusion in its density, and examine the phenomena whose complexity has been tagged by this easy category – exclusion. Herein perhaps one can locate the richness of historical practice, which is incessantly leveled in polemical debate that parades itself as theory. Perhaps rather than the Subject (even in its exclusions) what really characterizes Foucault’s work is the jettisoning of the Subject itself, in an endeavor to map out what Foucault calls elsewhere “discursive regularities”. The implications that this would have on method are clear and need to be examined. But first a look at *Madness and Civilization*.

PART III

The point of departure is Derrida’s first claim, that in Descartes exclusion lies the entire problematic of the project a claim Foucault, for inexplicable reasons, leaves uncontested. Madness is excluded in the classical age, and this is its defining characteristic. Let us return to the early hours of Foucault’s work.

The first chapter is a report of a series of ‘facts’. Leprosy disappears, not as a result of an advancement of medical science, but because of segregation and the blocking off of routes through which the disease spread. Yet the perceptual structure that defined the attitude towards the leper – does not disappear. The series of events do not have a symmetrical relationship with a series of perceptions. Already Foucault has crafted different registers that are vulnerable to each others terms. The houses themselves remain. In paratactic fashion Foucault moves on to the imaginary landscape of the Renaissance, where the ship of fools is a powerful motif. Here the mad are sent away. It is not as though we do not have exclusion in the Renaissance, in fact madmen were “thrown into prison”(10 MC), “excluded”(10 MC), but are not dealt within “the grid of social utility and security but with rite” (10 MC).

In a further fleshing out of madness during the Renaissance period Foucault points out to the complimentary attitudes through which the moral fables deal with madness (the denunciation of madness becoming now the general form of criticism) and the farces and the sorties (where madness was often the guardian of truth). In the more learned literature madness is seen at the heart of reason and truth. Madness has come to replace death as the dominant motif, its mockery at the heart of life, and its signs part of the weave of everyday life substitute the solemnity of death, as the figure of the absolute limit, the somber threshold of life and the after-life. Madness reappears in the break-down of Gothic architecture, where the

ceaseless multiplication of meaning distorts the austerity of form. It is this fascination that shapes the figures of animality in the grotesque. Yet a fascination that is also one that sees the seed of knowledge deep within the womb of the grotesque. Literature and philosophy have a different relationship with madness; it is one of “attraction” not “fascination”(25 MC). Truth does not hide within the folds of madness; rather madness is seen as a punishment for the delusions of reason. And therefore from being a sign, carrying within it an irreducible relation with truth and the world it here becomes a mirror having an exclusive relationship with Man himself. And then Foucault moves on slowly to the emergence of another attitude to madness – that of the Classical Age. Right in the thick decay of the Renaissance in the work of Shakespeare and Cervantes, one still discerns the figure of madness as the ‘absolute limit’, the twilight between the here and the other. Whereas increasingly this is being replaced by a madness that is severing its ties with the tragic, with the somber drama of Renaissance literature, and moving to forge links with the comic, with the ironic. From the hanging on the edge of the known, and pointing to the frightening unknown it moves squarely to the center of the world – occupying another place. Becoming the sign post of error, and the sign of illusion it is comfortably ensconced in the humdrum experience of everyday life. (was there, just a little while ago a furious debate on the expulsion of madness by Classical Reason?!). However this is perhaps too early in the dawn of the Classical Age, and it is in the next chapter on the Great Confinement that Foucault invokes Descartes – the subject of the debate discussed.

Let us briefly return to the Renaissance, and the place of madness. 1. Madmen are sent away (ship of fools) and excluded (imprisoned). 2. Madness is seen as the primary object of critique (moral tales) and at the esoteric center of reason (farces). 3. Madness is formed through an excess of meaning, thereby trans-forming traditional forms. 4. They form the tragic limit as well as the comic center. A multiplicity of registers, sources, modes of analysis that sit uneasily with one another. And yet it is precisely this dis-ease that allows us to recapture the multi-dimensionality of the phenomena itself that acquires value by the very incongruity of perspectives. And yet people accuse Foucault of having been a structuralist. There is no Subject/subject. But there are many object-problems. In similar vein there is not a single method, here method collapses into language as that which contours the domain of objects and registers - levels at which the analysis is pitched. But perhaps we need to wait for a fuller examination of the Classical Age.

We now come to the classical age, where Reason is to have ‘excluded’ madness.

After Descartes, Foucault moves on to outline the status of the General Hospital, instituted in 1657. It is understood within the grid of the politics of that age, having a “quasi absolute sovereignty” (40 MC), having been established by the collusion between the rising bourgeoisie and the Monarchy in their struggle against the Church (though the Church establish their own houses of confinement, we are reminded that this is the era of the counter-reformation where the Church is valiantly trying to reestablish its authority). The hospital has little to do with the medical establishment – as we now know it – but houses all kinds of people – “those condemned by law, young men who disturbed their families peace, and the inane”(45 MC). It is this heterogeneous mass that takes the place of the leper.

However this heterogeneous mass is shaped by a differential structure, lying at the interstices of a various planes juxtaposed against one another through an evident incongruity. First, they are not driven away (‘excluded’) but made to work. This, the economics of the situation plays the double role of absorbing unemployment – at a time of general economic and

political crises – and stimulating production. Morality insinuates itself into the economic modalities; as the hospital and the workhouse have an ethical status. A status not within eccleasical cosmology but firmly within the contemporary politics of the city and economic production. Rites of exclusion turn into imperatives demanding use. In fact a symbolic of exclusion is now incorporated into the mechanics of production. It is this new form of morality that becomes part of the politics of the State that Foucault draws our attention to; where the determinants of Unreason have an irreducible relation to the meaning and function of production. And from inhabiting the threshold of the world, the sign of the Other, madness becomes firmly embedded within the sphere of the socio-political, or rather it becomes that grotesque negative through which the myth of a perfect society constantly measures itself, thereby playing the false game of infinite self-referential reassurance.

Yet within the multiple that composes the face of Unreason, madness has a special contour, it can be recognized by its special “modulation”. Just as Unreason is shoved into the mute ground of the invisible from days of the Renaissance where it “come out in the light of the day”; in madness alone, perhaps, one can trace the obscure kinship with its past. For the Madman is displayed in public, takes part in performances and “continues to be present in the stage of the world”(69 MC). It is through the figure and force of animality too that Classical Man incorporates madness into Man's being as the ground of his nature. Madness now expresses an immediate relation to its own self, and far from being a sickness it protected man the fragilities of his nature/ the forces of Nature itself. Again we have no Subject, but a series of object-problems corresponding to a series of languages/registers.

In the next chapter Foucault again readjust his lenses. He now looks closely at the categories of passion and delirium and their relation to madness. As he is keen to prove he is not looking at madness itself but at the ways in which it was named and recognized. In the mental world of Classical Man passion was the rushing force that mocked at modern distinctions between body and soul. Movement of fluids inflected the waters of emotion, determining and directing man's general disposition. It is well known that the soul was not a form of shadowy interiority, vacant to the affects of the body's swinging mood. And it is here in this context that delirium was a condition that lay at the bottom of every man, the first and last structure of language. Madness is the high-pressured curve lying deep within, ready to recoil at any time and at any place impervious to the dictates of mind and reason. In fact Foucault demonstrates the contemporary recognition in a knot where madness and reason were entangled in such a tight embrace making one indispensable to the other. For deep within madness was found the perfection of a language. And it is in this form that madness could be likened to other phenomena with which it shared a deep and mysterious kinship – dreams and hallucinations. Dreams not independent of, extricated from the body of sleep, but along with it as a continuous whole, that contained within itself memory and predication. Madness, reason and dreams constituted a thick density of critical mass. And, yet again, there is no Subject, but a series of object-problems corresponding to the language-registers.

Does the richness of Foucault's work allow him to claim 11 years later that the Classical Age was indeed responsible for the exclusion of Madness? Does he not do violence to his own work by reducing his project to a textualist reading (although even here one of his most forceful arguments is the double nature of the Meditations, a structure of propositions and a series of acts/ as the meditative exercise) in the hope of recuperating a bland and limited category – that of exclusion?

There seems to be an abyss that separates the positions of Foucault and Derrida, and yet there

are certain ways in which their projects are complicit. To further accentuate the abyss as well as the nuance in which Foucault and Derrida fork apart, it is perhaps best to examine their positions in relation to what I will call here conventional historiography – that would include many of the texts dealt with in this historiography seminar. The problematics I wish to examine are 1. Subject/Consciousness. 2. Change/Continuity.

Man as a universal is taken as the Subject of conventional historiography. In fact it is the subject that is the objective condition that enables this historical enterprise. I take two Fernand Braudel and EP Thomson, powerful representations of two different schools, or perhaps *styles* of history-writing as representative samples. Closely tied in with the subject is the question of consciousness; this relationship is articulated most explicitly in Marc's Bloch's *Historian's Craft* – where Man as Subject/Consciousness is taken as the primary object of study. It is only through the recognition of the fact of consciousness that's adventures and misadventures can be mapped, tracked and evaluated. Thus in *The Making of the English Working Class* EP Thompson is concerned with the “emergence” of working class consciousness, and within this problematic is keen to grant agential function to the working classes. The question of agency is an implication of the fact of consciousness, for choice makes sense only if one is aware of the choice one makes. In fact EP Thompson is keen to critique what he sees as “structuralism” through an injection of consciousness. Although such as argument is always trapped in an aporia – as agency draws its meaning from the overcoming of a determination, and a determination is always part of a structure. Agency needs the structure for it to exist, and it is this difficult relationship that EP Thompson seems insensitive to. Proving agency is always a question of structure. And it is here again that the subject, as a subject fully conscious seems either theoretically untenable or inadequately worked out. The Subject is the objective condition for the working out of structure and agency. If one is granting Man a certain special position in History, his peculiarity would have to constantly returned to and revisited. If his choice is indeed limited by a structure, what indeed is so special about him, and why is he the fundamental subject of the historical enterprise?

Closely connected with the question of Subject-consciousness is the question of time. Taking man as a primary Subject and assuming his singular and coherent consciousness translates, almost automatically, on a singular notion of time itself. Time is how Man as rational Subject, experiences it on a singular register. Braudel made this question one of his explicit sites of reflection and we will see how in his work a reworking of the notion of time would alter the nature of the subject. In the *Mediterranean and the World of the Mediterranean* he famously speaks of different temporalities, and with this reworking of the nature of time, where we now have indeed a notion of a differential temporal, effects the scattering of the singular subject. Thus there is the time of nature, the time of trade routes, the time of politics and all function in different ways through different “logics”. This very interesting reworking of time also implies a reworking of space. As his 3 volumed study of Capitalism he points out that the more fundamental temporality of the Indian Ocean trade, saw Kerala (a small state in south west India) as part sections of the Middle East and South East Asia. Thus this was the continuum in which Kerala made (and perhaps still makes) sense, rather than trying to tie it with the land mass called India, just through the argument of spatial contiguity through land. Or perhaps one could complicate the argument further and claim the Kerala existed simultaneously as part of both the Middle East to the South East trading zone and the Indian subcontinent though different temporalities – the one of trading and the other of politics. However Braudel unfortunately does not work through the relationship between the various temporalities that he so scrupulously demarcates. It is as though they lie juxtaposed alongside

each other with no real attempt to work through their relations. Of course the nature of such an endeavor cannot be underestimated; for one has to work through the relationship in such a manner as to avoid a reductive homogeneity at all costs. If the working-out results in a seamless narrative, the very nature of the initial project would crash to the ground. The subject has been fractured with man and his politics occupying only a minor region. And yet Man as Subject is left unharmed, assured in his full subjectivity. Thus we see that such a division of Time has no real effect on Man as Subject though he is placed along with different objects of study (If Braudel is to be believed the real subject of his study is the Mediterranean). But by leaving the subjectivity of Man intact, can just an excess of information in different planes, do away with him surreptitiously returning as the primary subject ?

The question of change and continuity is, of course, directly linked to the question of time. Works such as those of Braudel and Thompson have been keen to demonstrate the lines of continuity between a series of events. Here history as a story has the function of the providing the inner meaning of what would otherwise be seen as a disparate set of phenomena. It is the analytical grid through which one apprehends the world; the careful explanation that extricates the *telos* from the vast body of material. And it is this that is seen to lend coherence and meaning to the historians project. If I have used meaning and *telos* interchangeably, it is because I wish to underline the direct way in which *telos* and meaning are chained to one another. *Telos* a category of causality in Aristotle referred to purpose/end/ that for the sake of which. And it is here that one can see that continuity in effect also means cause; and the relationship between knowledge and knowing the cause behind it has ancient sanctity. In this economy of analysis discontinuity is the aberration and the very sign of the mysterious and the mystical. A domain that the historian bars himself from, content with the careful and deliberate analysis of finding of the 'what' through the 'why' and 'how'. However the Aristotelian division of Causality into four specific and distinct categories have been abandoned for a far more monolithic and nebulous category – reason. Historians see their task as unraveling the reason of why things happen, and here it is precisely discontinuity that is abandoned in the art of finding the hidden reason. Thus EP Thompson wants to prove that there was nothing sudden about working-class consciousness, but that consciousness was forged in the furnace of time and experience. It is through the bonds of religion and custom from time immemorial that the working-class find the resources to build a community. Of course this is not to underplay the importance of the emergence of the factory or modern industry, but still we are told there can never be an immaculate rupture, there needs to be a story behind some where, there needs to be a cause, in short there needs to be a history. This is the problem for EP Thompson where the subject of his book, the working class, loses all specificity because the Subject is never taken as the site of reflection. No threshold exists through which the working class is established as such because the *real* Subject is singular and continuous. And he is impervious to the thick description, the wealth of empirical detail that Thompson provides us as the latter is but a function of the former.

It does not take long to piece the relationship between the subject/consciousness/man, time and the question of change. In the case of EP Thompson there is a perfect correspondence and symmetry and perfect interdependence between man as the speaking/rational subject, a homogenous temporality and a singular continuum. In Braudel the question is slightly more complicated, but only slightly so. For as has been pointed out multiple subjects still emanate from and assume the Subject as their ground having a corresponding relation to continuous homogenous time.(this *quality* of Time is preserved in Braudel though he may have divided it into different registers). We will see that this is a state of affairs that neither Foucault nor

Derrida would be comfortable with.

For both Foucault and Derrida would maintain the impossibility of the fully coherent Subject. Yet for Derrida this properly ontological impossibility paradoxically performs a double function; that of limiting and instituting the Subject. Whereas in Foucault's work the subject as ontology is jettisoned through a radical reworking of the empirical. We return to Descartes here. This because Descartes is often held to have inaugurated the modern version of the speaking subject. And so both Foucault and Derrida mount critiques of the Subject, and it is in the nature of the critiques, or so it seems, rather than the object of the critique that Foucault seem to differ. While Derrida is keen to prove the complicity of any subjectivity with the risk and (therefore) fact of madness, Foucault in the specifics of the debate seems to want to prove that that subjectivity is constituted only through the exclusion of madness. Thus, again, for the both of them subjectivity has an irreducible relationship to madness. Yet Derrida, in his critique of Foucault, argues that Foucault is unable to prove the specifics of the Descartes case with respect to madness. Here his argument works, at one level, through a kind of contradiction. For he accuses Foucault of not understanding the meaning of Descartes words in-themselves, and then he goes on to show that the real aporia is the fact the madness and subjectivity-reason are entangled in a way impossible to fully disentangle – thus indirectly admitting to the impossibility to really determining the meaning, the meaning-itself of Descartes words (or meaning in general as Deconstruction tirelessly tries to prove). This is slightly disingenuous because he also accuses Foucault of trying to write the history of madness itself, which he then goes on to argue is a reinscription of the exclusionary practice of the Cogito (this is of course a reading that Derrida is supposed to be critiquing). But if as Derrida says, madness and reason are irreducible linked through a general economy wouldn't the endeavors of trying to decipher meaning in-itself and madness in-itself be equally absurd. But perhaps we should leave Deconstruction in the knots and proceed to see how *Madness and Civilization* as a work of history deals with the difficult set of questions posed.

The subject of the work is explicitly not Man as Subject, for Foucault is keen to unravel the "archeology of a silence". As we have shown the registers in the text keep shifting, as do the 'temporalities'. The shifting registers are a function of a problem – that of madness and its (im)possible relationship to representation. The registers include the level of state policy (and its contexts – the emerging alliance between the bourgeoisie and the monarchy against the Church, the wars of religion, the economic depression etc); the perception of the disease (passion and delirium and their articulation in a matrix that didn't not recognize modern distinctions between body, mind and language at least no in the same way); the perception of madness through various genres of the artistic world – visual and print culture (Literature, painting, woodcuts, morality tails). Thus we have the problem of madness refracted through a differential economy. There is no Subject but a series of different effects mapped out. It is the arena and multiplicity of effects that does away with both the subject as social scientist and subject as universal Man; proving in effect one is the repetition of the other. Rather the focus is on the strains of work of which the object and method are immanent facts.

Is thus an "archaeology of silence" revealed? Clearly what is at stake here is the possibility of speaking of madness without it being a monologue about madness (something that Foucault accuses psychiatry and psychology of doing). Does this make sense? Is this possible? What is the method that Foucault uses? It seems to be so if one is able to evolve different languages to speak about madness, and in the process let madness inflect the process of work proving their mysterious ties through the practice of the problem. And here when speaking about

madness his language does 'crack-up'. The shifting registers, the constant change in lenses, perspective and language one that an assiduous reader like Derrida seems to have left unrecognized. This is the splintering of Method that no longer becomes a function of the (double) transcendental subject (as social scientist or universal man). We need to return to Derrida's critique here. Foucault does recognize and underline the complicity between madness and reason – that Derrida is at such pains to prove and that he sees as his original and radical project that goes beyond Foucauldian archaeology. And yet Foucault continues to write about madness, not a history of madness as told to us by the doctors, through a history of ideas and as a teleology of Reason. And it is in this way that contrary to Derrida's claim, it is Foucault's work that is a radicalization of Deconstruction. The aporia is not just recognized but practiced (as Derrida himself noted in his critique), and it is *practiced* though the empirical archive engendering a multiplicity of aporias that are no longer a function of the speaking Subject. The singular *telos* is smashed against the table of analysis to reveal a geography of problems. Problems as the concretizing of the concept.

It is at this point perhaps we can return to professional historiography. Foucault is meticulous in his use of the empirical archive. In fact his analysis is through the archive/s it/themselves thus situating analysis in the field of immanence. The empirical is not a function of a prior method or the illustration of an abstract principle, but rather is indistinguishable from the work of thinking itself. Just as the unified Subject has splintered into various domains, in the same way a unified method too is abandoned for a differential analysis. Thus though Foucault has his prefaces the theoretical is not extraneous to the work that is to follow. It is in fact the various jostling of the different registers of the empirical that Foucault does away with methodological reserve. Reserve, that paradoxically in Derrida takes the form of the excess through which the restricted economy of history situates itself. Here Derrida is uncannily complicit with much contemporary historiography, for the latter too distinguishes between method and work, form and matter (what Derrida calls the sign itself and the historical structure). EP Thompson clearly, at the level of prose, makes a distinction between the more theoretical and the more empirical sections of the book. Braudel's marvelously thick description serve as functions of the prior theoretical problematics established. It would not be anything new to say that much of the recent work that historians churn out now-a-days begin with a theoretical introduction with an empirical illustration to follow – the conclusion often reiterating the introduction (making it so convenient for students to debate vociferously about the book having read only the first and last few pages). In this is the hidden assumption that there is a specific meaning in the text that is accessible to one and all for the reader to cull out, and in this lies the entire architectonic of the work. It is with this assumption that Derrida in fact starts – equating the passage in Descartes to the problematic of the entire book. A trap that Foucault himself in his response seems to fall for in/for.

But one could easily counter in the name of much historiography that the subject is not simply taken as a free agent. In fact it could well be argued that the nature of the historical enterprise from the origins of what we now take to be history is all about how circumstances and structures determine the agency of Man. And even EP Thompson, so keen to demolish structures and prove agency would not be naïve enough to fully believe in the absolute freedom of the individual. And in the work of someone like Braudel the limitations put on Man's actions is all but obvious. So what could be so new about Foucault's endeavor?

PART IV

Here one needs to reiterate that Foucault's project, in *Madness and Civilization* is not about the ways in which determinations limit Man's agency. But rather than what we now see as Man himself perhaps a historical phenomena – Man as we now know him. It is not the study the limits of man, but rather to unravel through history certain structures through which the world is apprehended and comprehended; and it is in the *Order of Things* that Foucault explicitly suggests that Man as we know 'it' (Foucault sees this as the phenomena when Man becomes the simultaneous subject and object of the world) is a recent phenomena. Thus in the Renaissance man is not seen as a critical term, an autonomous subject, but rather one among many objects in the vast stretches of the universe. It is through such a theoretical matrix that Foucault escapes from the whole argument about agency and structure. Man and his personal experience or individual creativity never concerned or interested Foucault, and he never tired of repeating this. Nether is he interested in a structure as a determination of freedom. Rather he is interested in the spaces as the signpost-sentries of the possible. It is in this way that Foucault departs from much of mainstream historiography escaping the double effect of the transcendental subject. By treating man as just a minor region in the great table of the world, Foucault is able to move beyond an obsession with the Subject, whether that obsession takes the form of critique (Derrida) or precondition/assumption (historiography). And yet the materials of the world are also the materials through which Foucault thinks through and with the world.

And so in Foucaults work, in the practice of historiography and history (for what is marvelous in Foucault is that there is no distinction between the terms) one sees a far more complex picture than a concern with Man as subject. In the same way the question of time and change is taken up. Discontinuity in Foucault is not a positivist fact discovered but rather a "deliberate operation" through which a series is determined in relation to another series. Thus the rupture is a cognitive tool, a method used by the historian to measure in precise terms the nature of the precise subject. (it is only the nebulous Subject that can wallow in a nebulous category- time). Thus change rather than being a metaphysical concept (whose criteria exists outside the material being examined) is replaced by a "set of transformations" that are internal to the specific set of problems and phenomena under scrutiny. It is only so that the specific contours and modulations of various problems (the subject-object series) can be mapped out rather than be absorbed into a meta-historical concepts like change and continuity. Time is not the exterior condition underlying events, but rather inextricably bound to the phenomena themselves. Subjects and methods become inter-functional phenomena grafting the specifics of their temporality.

It is so that the text it multi layered, polyvocal and cuts and slices through different ways and means. There is no, absolutely no privileging of the concepts. The concept is visible is made evident only through a problem, for only as a problem can abstraction be extracted from a concept. And it is the turning of concepts into different problems (at again the varying levels of policy, ideas, art, medicine) that are related to a macro problematic- madness that Foucault enriches the field of history and performs a break-through in the modalities of thinking about words and things. Difference is multifarious (rather than being deified into an all embracing aporia as in Deconstruction) and constantly shifting, and yet fashions a problem in the practice of dealing with it. And it is here that he again crucially departs with Deconstruction that incorporates any and all situations (textual in the case of the earlier Derrida but political and ethical in the case of the later Derrida) to a prior and fundamental

aporia – the unelaborated relationship between excess and the restricted economy. Or if one wants to be more blunt, and if one wants to use Foucault's words when he does not refer to Derrida but could very well have been thinking of him, one could say Deconstruction is in effect the function of "a transcendental narcissism". And it is against this form of transcendentalism that all of Foucault's oeuvre revolts against, a transcendentalism that dictates the matter at hand but simultaneously stays in and out of the matter at hand. Foucault rather is keen to work through a specific set of modalities through which a problem can and does articulate itself. And here lies the richness of his enterprise, where if one needs to put it trivially (but perhaps not just so) to really appreciate Foucault one would need to read every world of his texts, there's no easy intro-conclusion method here (and this is not the case with many works of history where the empirical is the equivalent of information, the demonstration of a worked out argument). And at the risk of being unjust to Derrida one could claim that Derrida has read one text carefully and seems to see the same text everywhere.

Foucault has escaped from the snares of the subject. The insidious subject that repeats himself as the object, thereby incorporating, or attempting to incorporate, the world as function. The measure and criteria for the work at hand is internal to it very crafting, doing away with the exteriority of a transcendental subject (whether as the social scientist or Man as Universal). It is only such that we are awoken from the "anthropological slumber". We have a complete overhauling in the theory of representation and meaning. Meaning cannot be divorced from the world in which it takes form. It is in this context that we return to the same problematic. A specific reading of Descartes does not exhaust or even reflect the work of *Madness and Civilization*. On the contrary the very nature of the practice of much history writing the argument can be extracted from the empirical detail being furnished with such care by the historian (as he himself is often the first one to do). By theorizing through immanence Foucault helps us radically rethink the place both theory and detail, working them through a style that exhausts both their possibilities with the result of a level of analysis where it is impossible to distinguish one from the other. Method is crafted from the reality of the real. Different subjects and different methods are mapped out without transcendental determination or function. Subject and method are rendered to have the same status and worked in through the very materiality of the event-object. And temporalities have been stitched into their skins.

The question posed at the outset – Can the endeavor of Man as subject speaking of the subjectivity of Man as object ever be a truthful enterprise? – needs to be left aside. Foucault helps us ask another question. Does freedom articulate itself in the concrete multiplication of the world through a certain *style* in which subject and method partake?

Abbreviations used:

WD *Writing and Difference* (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd London 1997)

MC *Madness and Civilization* trans. Howard Richard Howard (Vintage Books New York 1998)

EMF *Essential Works of Michel Foucault Vol II* ed. by James D Faubion (The New Press New York 1988)